Optimal Sizes of Farms under Varying Tenure Forms, Including Renting, Ownership, State, and Collective Structures

Abstract

Abstract Variants in tenure forms cause a range of optimal farm sizes in countries of various stages of economic development. Aside from capital restraints, however, modifications can be made in cost functions associated with each tenure form. The optimal use of inputs and farm size then is theoretically the same for individually operated farms. In the case of private, state, and cooperative farms, however, the same resolution is not possible in the short run. If the objective of the cooperative farm is maximum profit per member, this tenure form always has an optimal size smaller than a private or state farm.

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