Levels of theory‐of‐mind reasoning in competitive games

Abstract

Abstract The literature on recursive theory of mind (TOM) reasoning in interactive decision making (reasoning of the type “I think that you think that I think…”) has been pessimistic, suggesting that adults attribute to others levels of reasoning that are low and slow to increase with learning. In four experiments with college‐age adults playing sequential games, we examined whether choices and predictions were consistent with believing that others pursue their immediate self‐interest, or with believing that others reason through their own decision making, with fixed‐sum games that were simpler and more competitive. This manipulation led to higher‐level default TOM reasoning; indeed, reasoning against a lower‐level opponent was frequently consistent with assuming the opponent's reasoning to be higher‐level, leading to sub‐optimal choices. We conclude that TOM reasoning is not of a low level in all game settings; rather, individuals may display effective TOM reasoning, reflecting realistic assumptions about their opponents, in competitive and relatively simple games. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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