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Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability
13 references·0 citing·44 second hop
Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability (2006)Optimal state‐contingent regulation under…Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives (1997)Capital Structure with Counte…The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm (1994)The Capital Structure of a Re…Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability (1991)Contractual Design with Corre…Continuity in auction design (1991)Continuity in auction designRegulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions (1988)Regulating a Monopolist with …Optimal contracts with public ex post information (1988)Optimal contracts with public…Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Full Extraction of the Surplu…Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)Optimal Selling Strategies un…Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing (1984)Regulation, Asymmetric Inform…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (1980)A Differential Approach to Do…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (1990)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance (1986)The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After (1994)Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information (2004)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Hierarchical Regulatory Control (1987)Procurement auctions and unit-price contracts (2003)Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions (2008)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)Make Trade Not War? (2008)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Wage-Employment Contracts (1983)Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions (1988)On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation (2013)A STATE‐PREFERENCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL FINANCIAL LEVERAGE (1973)The Capital Structure Puzzle (1984)The Theory of Capital Structure (1991)Chapter 16 Regulation of Natural Monopoly (2007)Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: The Role of Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Independence (2009)Funding and Financing Infrastructure: The Joint-Use of Public and Private Finance (2018)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)The regulation of multiproduct firms (1990)On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist (1992)Regulation of Natural Monopoly (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
  • 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent586 cited
  • 1984Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing380 cited
  • 1980A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms154 cited
  • 1994The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm136 cited
  • 1988Optimal contracts with public ex post information134 cited
  • 1988Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions94 cited
  • 1997Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives88 cited
  • 1991Continuity in auction design88 cited
  • 1991Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability72 cited

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