Truth and Multiple Realizability

Michael Patrick Lynch

85 citations0/0 files storedAustralasian Journal of Philosophy

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.

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2007Realization and the metaphysics of mind1 2009Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism 2009Values of Truth and Truth of Values 2008STABILIZING ALETHIC PLURALISM 2011SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM 2017Truth and Dependence 2013Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics 2016Putting Pluralism in its Place

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