Effects of endowment amount and attributions on responses to a subgroup social dilemma.

Abstract

A subgroup social dilemma exists when the personal interests of 2 or more individuals conflict with the interest of a larger group to which they belong such that a defecting response is economically more rational for each individual than a cooperative response and the individuals involved identify with different (sub)groups. The impact of endowment amount and attributions for the amounts allocated on responses to a subgroup social dilemma was examined. Justified inequality and luck-based equality generated low levels of cooperation, whereas justified equality and luck-based inequality generated high levels of cooperation. Five potential psychological mediators were examined: attraction to the subgroup, perceived interdependency, superordinate identification, self-focused thoughts, and normative expectations. Theoretical and empirical implications are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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