Shareholder and stakeholder value in corporate downsizing – The case of United Technologies Corporation

Abstract

In recent years, many corporations have initiated downsizing programs to eliminate jobs, close facilities and withdraw from major lines of business. These initiatives have been justified in the name of creating “lean and efficient” organizations. In many cases, top management is rewarded with large bonus compensation packages. Such rewards are considered to be consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholder value. We compare stakeholder and shareholder value models of management accountability to gain insights into the broader economic and societal consequences of the current financial reporting model. Specifically, we examine downsizing at United Technologies Corporation to demonstrate how current financial reporting practices privilege shareholder/management interests over other stakeholders and favor actions that may result in detrimental effects to corporate stakeholders and society at large. This paper extends extant research by providing a concrete example of how “generally‐accepted” financial reports may be used to analyze economic events (like corporate downsizing) through multiple perspectives.

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