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The role of interest rate taxes in credit markets with divisible projects and asymmetric information
7 references·1 citing·29 second hop
The role of interest rate taxes in credit markets with divisible projects and asymmetric information (1989)The role of interest rate taxes in credit…Signaling in Credit Markets (1988)Signaling in Credit MarketsToo Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information (1987)Too Much Investment: A Proble…Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗ (1987)Some recent developments in t…Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation (1977)Informational Asymmetries, Fi…INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FI…A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)A model of insurance markets …The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Market for "Lemons": Qual…Entrepreneurship Policies : Principles, Problems and Opportunities (2009)Entrepreneurship Policies : P…An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1991)Job Market Signaling (1973)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing (1976)Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition (1990)The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence (2000)Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (2006)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Interactions between Institutional and Informal Credit Agencies in Rural India (1990)Symbiosis vs. crowding-out: the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries (1999)Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection (2000)Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market (1994)Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information (2000)American Economic Review (2019)Financial Inclusion in Emerging Economies: The Application of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Credit Risk Assessment (2021)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)India's Economic Reforms, 1991-2001 (1996)Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect (2000)A Theory of Discouraged Borrowers (2003)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy Formulation (1991)Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation (1990)The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data (1994)The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism22,977 cited
  • 1977INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION4,056 cited
  • 1977Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation3,772 cited
  • 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1,036 cited
  • 1987Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information879 cited
  • 1987Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗294 cited
  • 1988Signaling in Credit Markets169 cited

Cited by

  • 2009Entrepreneurship Policies : Principles, Problems and Opportunities6 cited

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