Citation map · Study

SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming

11 references·1 citing·42 second hop

FromToDepth

this work references cited by second hop

References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
2001Contracting theory and accounting1,053 cited
1989Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation877 cited
2008Handbook of Management Accounting Research384 cited
1994Managerial Uses of Accounting Information189 cited
1981Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment187 cited
2006Agency Theory and Management Accounting126 cited
2004Lessons Lost in Linearity: A Critical Assessment of the General Usefulness of LEN Models in Compensation Research54 cited
2006Uncertainty, Legal Liability, and Incentive Contracts31 cited

Cited by

2020Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors31 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work