Worker Preference and Market Compensation for Job Risk

Abstract

Workers choose a job and receive in return a bundle consisting of income and a probability of job injury. The authors view this income- job-risk bundle chosen by the worker as being exchanged in an implici t market. By jointly estimating the market income-job-risk locus and the optimum conditions for utility maximization, they are able to identif y the market locus and parameters of the workers' utility function. In contrast to previous work, the authors are able to derive valuations of discrete changes in job risk for each individual in the sample. They present evidence that an increase in nonlabor income leads workers to select safer jobs. Copyright 1988 by MIT Press.

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