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A new approach to the implementation problem
13 references·16 citing·35 second hop
A new approach to the implementation problem (1988)A new approach to the implementation prob…The Theory of Social Choice (2015)The Theory of Social ChoiceNash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality (1999)Nash Equilibrium and Welfare …Non-cooperative games (1989)Non-cooperative gamesGame Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees (1985)Game Theoretic Analysis of Vo…Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees (1984)Game Theoretic Analysis of Vo…The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey (1983)The Theory of Implementation …The Strategy of Social Choice (1983)The Strategy of Social ChoiceThe Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)The Implementation of Social …The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness (1977)The equivalence of strong pos…Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance (1977)Manipulation of Schemes that …Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Agreeing to DisagreeManipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-Cooperative GamesStrategy-proofness in the Large (2017)Strategy-proofness in the Lar…Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (2013)Simple mechanisms and prefere…An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design (2013)An Introduction to Robust Mec…Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations* (2012)Subgame-Perfect Implementatio…Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine (2012)Robust virtual implementation…Implementation with evidence (2012)Implementation with evidenceMultiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation (2010)Multiplicity of mixed equilib…Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful (2009)Mechanisms for Making Crowds …Aggregation of expert opinions (2008)Aggregation of expert opinionsThe role of independence in the Green–Lin Diamond–Dybvig model (2007)The role of independence in t…Role of honesty in full implementation (2007)Role of honesty in full imple…Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2007)Distributed Algorithmic Mecha…The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2004)The Theory of Implementation …Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation (2001)Some Limitations of Virtual B…A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium (1992)A social choice rule and its …Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences (1990)Renegotiation-Proof Implement…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory (1982)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Contracts as Reference Points * (2008)Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (2008)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)The Possibility of Social Choice (1999)Equilibrium points in n -person games (1950)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Prediction, Learning, and Games (2006)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information (1992)Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation (2005)Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination (1977)On a Class of Poverty Measures (1980)On the Methodological Framework of Composite Indices: A Review of the Issues of Weighting, Aggregation, and Robustness (2018)Approval Voting (1978)House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible (1992)A theory of sequential reciprocity (2003)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1951Non-Cooperative Games6,999 cited
  • 1989Non-cooperative games5,594 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1976Agreeing to Disagree2,499 cited
  • 1999Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality1,182 cited
  • 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility809 cited
  • 2015The Theory of Social Choice700 cited
  • 1977Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance443 cited
  • 1983The Strategy of Social Choice307 cited
  • 1977The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness251 cited
  • 1983The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey223 cited
  • 1984Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees198 cited
  • 1985Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees195 cited

Cited by

  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 2007Role of honesty in full implementation94 cited
  • 2012Implementation with evidence85 cited

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  • 2013Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty74 cited
  • 2007Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design73 cited
  • 2007The role of independence in the Green–Lin Diamond–Dybvig model66 cited
  • 2012Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*65 cited
  • 2017Strategy-proofness in the Large65 cited
  • 1992A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium64 cited
  • 2008Aggregation of expert opinions58 cited
  • 1990Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences57 cited
  • 2009Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful41 cited
  • 2010Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation33 cited
  • 2012Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine32 cited
  • 2001Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation31 cited
  • 2013An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design30 cited