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Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design

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References

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1979The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information**This work was supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. SOC75-21820 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University.242 cited
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1997The demand revealing process: To distribute the surplus89 cited
2008Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms51 cited

Cited by

2009Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization43 cited
2009Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments40 cited
2009Efficient Mechanisms with Dynamic Populations and Dynamic Types31 cited
2009Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms29 cited

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