On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment

Gilat Levy · Ronny Razin

81 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

We analyze a cheap talk game, à la Crawford and Sobel, in a multidimensional state and policy space. A feature of the multidimensional state space is that communication on one dimension often reveals information on others. We show how this feature imposes bounds on communication.

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1982Strategic Information Transmission 2002Authority and Communication in Organizations 1985Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information 2002Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk 2005Comparative cheap talk 2008Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces 2004Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts

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2011Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 2016Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria 2016Communication with multiple senders: An experiment 2019Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication 2019Willingness to Communicate: A Predictor of Pushing Vocabulary Knowledge from Receptive to Productive 2012Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions 2019Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude

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