The Changing Nature of Accountability: The Role of the Inspector General in Federal Agencies

Abstract

Federal managers are currently changing the way they business in response to a variety of initiatives from both the executive and legislative branches. Signals from the White House contained in the National Performance Review (1993) and from the Congress in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 call for managers to focus on programmatic results rather than procedural guidelines as they steer their programs. With the relatively new emphasis at the federal level on results-oriented management, the role of program review and accountability mechanisms also requires reconsideration. The National Performance Review calls upon managers to do more with less, to put customers first, and to identify ways to minimize procedural obstacles to pursuing results. The Office of Management and Budget, also in the executive office, has pressed the agencies to provide measures of performance with their FY 1996 and FY 1997 budgetary submissions. The Government Performance and Results Act calls upon managers to formulate both strategic and performance plans, monitor program delivery by tracking performance indicators, and assess policy and program outcomes. In response to the many executives and legislative initiatives, managers and a host of consultants have been working to identify ways to serve customers better and measure performance. The Jury is still out, however, regarding how managers, or any of the oversight bodies, are truly using these measures of performance in making resource allocation decisions (Newcomer, 1995). The related, as yet unanswered question is: how will managers be held accountable for results? Ronald Moe, among other critics, has questioned the impact that these initiatives have upon lines of statutory authority and responsibility (1994). Moe points out that the entrepreneurial management paradigm underlying the National Performance Review calls for measuring success by customer satisfaction and for valuing flexibility to facilitate change without fear of procedural constraints (114). In fact, the revisions in managerial freedom raise questions about accountability and how traditional oversight mechanisms will be used to hold program managers accountable. Both the National Performance Review and the Government Performance and Results Act call for managerial waivers from traditional regulations to help entrepreneurial managers as they strive to demonstrate performance accountability rather than procedural accountability. Focus of This Study The federal oversight offices of interest in this study are those of the inspector general. These offices are unique among oversight entities in that they were created by statute (The Inspector General Act of 1978 and the Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988) to be independent of either executive or legislative political influence. The inspectors general are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, report directly to the head of their host department and agency, and keep Congress and their agency head fully informed of any problems and deficiencies found in program delivery. The mission of the offices of inspector general, as spelled out in the original statute, is to: * Conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations. * Promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the agency. * Prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in agency programs and operations. * Review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations. * Keep the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations. The first report issued by the National Performance Review specifically mentioned the offices of inspector general. In 1993, the first National Performance Review volume of recommendations asked the inspector general's offices to broaden the focus of the inspectors general from strict compliance auditing to evaluating management control systems (31). …

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