Treating Policy Brokers Seriously: Evidence from the Climate Policy

Karin Miryam Ingold · Frédéric Varone

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Policy Transfer and Learning Public Policy and Administration Research Sustainability and Climate Change Governance

Abstract

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) pays special attention to “so-called” policy brokers when explaining policy change. However, this prominent policy approach neither clearly defines who the policy brokers are nor identifies under which institutional rules they have an influence on policy processes and outputs. This article thus formulates two theoretical hypotheses that complement the ACF and then proceeds to undertake the first empirical testing of these hypotheses within the Swiss climate policy (1990–2008). The empirical results show that, in the case under investigation, the strategic interest-based behavior of two policy brokers (i.e., one public administration and one political party), as well as two institutionalized veto points (i.e., optional referendum and parliamentary committee), are crucial factors explaining policy brokers' influence on policy process and change.

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References

1984Agendas, alternatives, and public policies 1993Agendas and instability in American politics 2009Understanding Institutional Diversity 1994Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach 1988An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein 2003Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work 1995Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism 1961A theory of economic development.

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2020A Research Agenda for the Study of Policy Entrepreneurs 2019Sharpening Advocacy Coalitions 2017There and Back Again: A Tale of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 2013Drivers of collaboration to mitigate climate change: An illustration of Swiss climate policy over 15 years 2017Bringing the policy making perspective in: A political science approach to social acceptance 2014Policy Change in Comparative Contexts: Applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework Outside of Western Europe and North America

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