Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation

Frank Jackson · Philip N. Pettit

363 citations0/0 files storedThe Philosophical Quarterly

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit; Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 178, 1 January 1995, Pages 20–40, htt

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References

1989Dispositional Theories of Value 1982Contractualism and utilitarianism 1978Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?1979Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology

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