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Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
16 references·16 citing·34 second hopsampled
Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence (1999)Checks and balances, and the supply of ce…The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence (1995)The Political Economy of Cent…Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts (1995)Optimal Inflation Targets, `C…Optimal contracts for central bankers (1995)Optimal contracts for central…Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)Decision Making in Political …Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence (1993)Openness and Inflation: Theor…Designing institutions for monetary stability (1993)Designing institutions for mo…Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Central Bank Independence and…Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility (1992)Optimal Commitment in Monetar…Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (1992)Central Bank Strategy, Credib…Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries (1991)Political and Monetary Instit…Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies (1989)Structure and Process, Politi…A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion (1989)A Theory of Political Control…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Rules, discretion and reputat…Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission (1983)Bureaucratic Discretion or Co…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Rules Rather than Discretion:…Political Pressure on Central Banks (2021)Political Pressure on Central…Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending? (2015)Central Bank Independence and…International Finance and Central Bank Independence: Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital (2014)International Finance and Cen…Can Developing Countries Both Decentralize and Depoliticize Urban Water Services? Evaluating the Legacy of the 1990s Reform Wave (2014)Can Developing Countries Both…When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set (2010)When is a central bank govern…Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions (2010)Exchange Rate Regimes and Ind…What Determines Debt Intolerance? The Role of Political and Monetary Institutions (2009)What Determines Debt Intolera…The Independence of International Organizations (2006)The Independence of Internati…The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors (2005)The Formal Independence of Re…Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies (2004)Veto Players and the Rule of …Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions (2002)Veto Players and the Choice o…Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability (2002)Regulatory and Supervisory In…Reconsidering central bank independence (2002)Reconsidering central bank in…Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments (2002)Checks and Balances, Private …Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence (2001)Central Bank Independence: An…Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity? (2000)Decentralization and Inflatio…Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior (1972)Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (1987)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations (1999)On the Determination of the Public Debt (1979)A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions (1998)The Futures of European Capitalism (2002)Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States (2004)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements (1961)Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the Natural Rate of Unemployment (1973)Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies (1991)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. 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this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy3,625 cited
  • 1995Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism2,607 cited
  • 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence1,830 cited
  • 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries1,583 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence1,366 cited
  • 1989Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies1,208 cited
  • 1995Optimal contracts for central bankers1,131 cited
  • 1993Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence970 cited
  • 1989A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion605 cited
  • 1992Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility595 cited
  • 1995Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts

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593 cited
  • 1993Designing institutions for monetary stability573 cited
  • 1995The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence539 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2009What Determines Debt Intolerance? The Role of Political and Monetary Institutions285 cited
    • 2006The Independence of International Organizations246 cited
    • 2000Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?223 cited
    • 2002Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability216 cited
    • 2002Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments175 cited
    • 2010When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set153 cited
    • 2001Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence146 cited
    • 2004Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies137 cited
    • 2002Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions135 cited
    • 2014International Finance and Central Bank Independence: Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital133 cited
    • 2002Reconsidering central bank independence130 cited
    • 2005The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors119 cited
    • 2021Political Pressure on Central Banks117 cited
    • 2010Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions110 cited
    • 2014Can Developing Countries Both Decentralize and Depoliticize Urban Water Services? Evaluating the Legacy of the 1990s Reform Wave102 cited
    • 2015Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?98 cited