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Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests
13 references·2 citing·36 second hop
Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests (2000)Adverse selection and categorical discrim…Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets (1996)Adverse selection with endoge…Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets (1996)Adverse selection and regulat…Health Economics Worldwide (1992)Health Economics WorldwideContributions to Insurance Economics (1992)Contributions to Insurance Ec…The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry (1986)The Efficiency Effects of Cat…The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry (1986)The Efficiency Effects of Cat…Health insurance and the demand for medical care (1983)Health insurance and the dema…Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry (1982)Categorizing Risks in the Ins…Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets (1978)Product differentiation and p…The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets (1977)The Rat Race and Internal Lab…The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities (1977)The Demand for Insurance and …A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)A model of insurance markets …Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…Risk Classification and Social Welfare (2006)Risk Classification and Socia…Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market (2006)Advantageous Effects of Regul…Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis (1962)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size (1994)Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications (2006)Job Market Signaling (1973)Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing (1976)Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition (1990)The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence (2000)Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (2006)The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity (1978)Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)The value of genetic information in the life insurance market (2000)The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements (2001)The Theory of Risk Classification (2013)Adverse selection and statistical discrimination (1983)Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection (1992)Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2000)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The government, the market, and the problem of catastrophic loss (1996)SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE (2013)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales (1976)Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. (1987)Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? (2000)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution (1974)The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information (1985)Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market (2005)Private Information and Insurance Rejections (2013)Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules (1983)WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY FOR CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS* (2004)Assessing Risky Social Situations (2010)Insurance with undiversifiable risk: Contract structure and organizational form of insurance firms (1993)Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information (2000)The Theory of Insurance Demand (2013)Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs (1997)
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References

  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information4,984 cited
  • 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1,036 cited
  • 1977The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets412 cited
  • 1977The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities402 cited
  • 1978Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets291 cited
  • 1992Contributions to Insurance Economics186 cited
  • 1982Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry161 cited
  • 1986The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry161 cited
  • 1986The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry156 cited
  • 1996Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets124 cited
  • 1983Health insurance and the demand for medical care110 cited
  • 1992Health Economics Worldwide90 cited
  • 1996Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets74 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market63 cited
  • 2006Risk Classification and Social Welfare

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61 cited