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On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items

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2016A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design103 cited
2015Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity94 cited
2016Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation75 cited
2014Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

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72 cited

2019Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity49 cited

2020A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer45 cited

2017The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation44 cited

2014Optimal mechanisms with simple menus42 cited

2015Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items36 cited

2014An n -to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications36 cited