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Is the ‘Linkage Principle’ Valid? Evidence from the Field
16 references·2 citing·34 second hop
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References

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  • 2001Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence from Thailand

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212 cited
  • 2000Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions141 cited
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    • 2019Information Transparency in Business-to-Business Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure39 cited
    • 2013Substitution Bias and External Validity: Why an Innovative Anti-Poverty Program Showed No Net Impact13 cited