Bayesian Belief Polarization

Alan Jern · Kai-min Kevin Chang · Charles Kemp

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

Empirical studies have documented cases of belief polarization, where two people with opposing prior beliefs both strengthen their beliefs after observing the same evidence. Belief polarization is frequently offered as evidence of human irrationality, but we demonstrate that this phenomenon is consistent with a fully Bayesian approach to belief revision. Simulation results indicate that belief polarization is not only possible but relatively common within the set of Bayesian models that we consider

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1979Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.2006Thinking and Deciding 1994A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.1999MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT PERCEPTUAL BIAS 2007The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.2008Framing effects and rationality 1985Averaging rules and adjustment processes in Bayesian inference

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