Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy

Abstract

The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002 Sides, A., Osherson, D., Bonini, N. and Viale, R. 2002. On the reality of the conjunction fallacy. Memory & Cognition, 30: 191–198. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal result is a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction fallacy, which is proven robust (i.e., not depending on various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation). The proposed analysis is shown distinct from contentions that the conjunction effect is in fact not a fallacy, and is compared with major competing explanations of the phenomenon, including earlier references to a confirmation-theoretic account.

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