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I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid1
5 references·10 citing·43 second hop
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000Knowledge and Its Limits5,056 cited
  • 2002Knowledge and its Limits2,789 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 2003Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism153 cited
  • 1977Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity99 cited

Cited by

  • 2009Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual52 cited
  • 2011Consensus Gentium: Reflections on the ‘Common Consent’ Argument for the Existence of God40 cited
  • 2018Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity39 cited
  • 2018Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy38 cited
  • 2011Slips*34 cited
  • 2013Integrity and the virtues of reason: leading a convincing life29 cited
  • 2013What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?27 cited
  • 2019Belief’s minimal rationality27 cited
  • 2011Following the argument where it leads26 cited
  • 2007XIII-Epistemic Self-Respect25 cited

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