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Principals and agents in crisis: reforms of accounting and audit at Lloyd’s, 1982-1986
16 references·0 citing·39 second hop
Principals and agents in crisis: reforms of accounting and audit at Lloyd’s, 1982-1986 (2000)Principals and agents in crisis: reforms …Transaction Costs and the Theory of the Firm: The Scope and Limitations of the New Institutional Approach (1997)Transaction Costs and the The…VOLUNTARY AUDITS IN NEW YORK MARKETS IN 1927: A CASE STUDY (1994)VOLUNTARY AUDITS IN NEW YORK …Agency theory: A falsificationist perspective (1989)Agency theory: A falsificatio…Panglossian accounting theories: The science of apologising in style (1988)Panglossian accounting theori…Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor (1987)Optimal Contracts with a Util…Positive Accounting Theory (1985)Positive Accounting TheoryOrganization Theory and Methodology. (1983)Organization Theory and Metho…Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence (1983)Agency Problems, Auditing, an…The Auditor As an Economic Agent (1982)The Auditor As an Economic Ag…Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution. (1982)Financial Reporting: An Accou…The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated Markets (1980)The Economic Role of the Audi…Optimal Contracts with Costly Conditional Auditing (1980)Optimal Contracts with Costly…Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting (1979)Auditing: Incentives and Trut…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Theories of Economic Regulation (1974)Theories of Economic Regulati…Theories of Economic Regulation (1974)Theories of Economic Regulati…Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure (1979)Institutions (1991)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Capital markets research in accounting (2001)Big 4 Office Size and Audit Quality (2009)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Accounting for Stewardship (1981)On Auditors and the Courts in an Adverse Selection Setting (1990)Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms (2004)Bank Directors’ Perceptions of Expanded Auditor's Reports (2016)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Auditing, directorships and the demand for monitoring (1993)Trust across borders (2005)Regulatory Oversight of Financial Reporting: Securities and Exchange Commission Comment Letters (2017)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The Nature of the Firm (1937)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)The Political Economy of Federalism (1985)STAKEHOLDER‐AGENCY THEORY (1992)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1999)Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature (2001)Performance matched discretionary accrual measures (2005)The economic implications of corporate financial reporting (2005)Earnings Innovations, Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns (1987)The crisis of fair-value accounting: Making sense of the recent debate (2009)The Effect of Disclosures by Management, Analysts, and Business Press on Cost of Capital, Return Volatility, and Analyst Forecasts: A Study Using Content Analysis (2009)RENT SEEKING: A SURVEY (1982)The New Comparative Economics (2003)Accounting activities, security prices, and class action lawsuits (1984)The Importance of Audit Firm Characteristics and the Drivers of Auditor Change in UK Listed Companies (1995)Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality (2008)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern (2005)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1985Positive Accounting Theory5,837 cited
  • 1974Theories of Economic Regulation1,535 cited
  • 1983Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence1,288 cited
  • 1974Theories of Economic Regulation1,153 cited
  • 1982Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution.953 cited
  • 1983Organization Theory and Methodology.806 cited
  • 1982The Auditor As an Economic Agent293 cited
  • 1980The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated Markets250 cited
  • 1987Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor139 cited
  • 1988Panglossian accounting theories: The science of apologising in style111 cited
  • 1997Transaction Costs and the Theory of the Firm: The Scope and Limitations of the New Institutional Approach70 cited
  • 1979Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting68 cited
  • 1980Optimal Contracts with Costly Conditional Auditing33 cited
  • 1994VOLUNTARY AUDITS IN NEW YORK MARKETS IN 1927: A CASE STUDY20 cited
  • 1989Agency theory: A falsificationist perspective

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