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Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice
16 references·1 citing·40 second hop
Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice (2008)Preference Handling in Combinatorial Doma…Combinatorial Auctions (2014)Combinatorial AuctionsEfficiency and Envy-freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity (2008)Efficiency and Envy-freeness …Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections (2007)Junta Distributions and the A…Combinatorial Auctions (2007)Combinatorial AuctionsA Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007)A Short Introduction to Compu…The Winner Determination Problem (2005)The Winner Determination Prob…Communication complexity of common voting rules (2005)Communication complexity of c…Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions (2005)Bidding Languages for Combina…On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods (2004)On approximately fair allocat…Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote (2004)Logical Preference Representa…Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions (2001)Bidding languages for combina…A Problem with Referendums (2000)A Problem with ReferendumsThe paradox of multiple elections (1998)The paradox of multiple elect…Exact analysis of Dodgson elections (1997)Exact analysis of Dodgson ele…Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)Voting schemes for which it c…The computational difficulty of manipulating an election (1989)The computational difficulty …Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods (2010)Fair Division under Ordinal P…A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation (1991)Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. (1994)Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions (1998)Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions (2003)Computational Social Choice (2012)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Single transferable vote resists strategic voting (1991)How hard is it to control an election? (1992)When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (2002)Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (2014)Public choice II (1989)The complexity of Kemeny elections (2005)Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders (2011)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Budgeted social choice: from consensus to personalized decision making (2011)Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2016)Resource allocation and the public sector (1967)Equity, envy, and efficiency (1974)Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. (1998)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2016)Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations (2018)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Auction design with costly preference elicitation (2005)A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction Formats (2008)A stochastic programming winner determination model for truckload procurement under shipment uncertainty (2009)Item pricing for revenue maximization (2008)Preference Handling— An Introductory Tutorial (2009)Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets (2014)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (2012)The Efficiency of Fair Division (2011)Fair Public Decision Making (2017)
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References

  • 2014Combinatorial Auctions923 cited
  • 1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election548 cited
  • 2004On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods537 cited
  • 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
  • 2007Combinatorial Auctions267 cited
  • 2007A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice264 cited
  • 1997Exact analysis of Dodgson elections186 cited
  • 2001Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions164 cited
  • 2008Efficiency and Envy-freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity164 cited
  • 2005The Winner Determination Problem162 cited
  • 1998The paradox of multiple elections162 cited
  • 2005Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions152 cited
  • 2007Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections148 cited
  • 2000A Problem with Referendums139 cited
  • 2004Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote134 cited
  • 2005Communication complexity of common voting rules134 cited

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Cited by

  • 2010Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods66 cited