Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT

Abstract

Studies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stress the role of formal panels in adjudicating trade conflicts. Yet most cases are settled beforehand in informal consultations. This article tests two sets of hypotheses about the decision to escalate GATT cases, one concerning the significance of the right to a panel, the other concerning the effects of political regime type. Results show that the right to a panel did not inspire more early settlement, more escalation, or more resolution through concessions at the panel stage; however, highly democratic dyads are more likely to achieve concession, but only at the consultation stage. This suggests that a strategy of tying hands, rather than adherence to legal (and other) norms of conflict resolution, is likely to shed light on the way democracies use formal third-party adjudication at GATT.

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