Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignments*

John S. Hughes · Li Zhang

40 citations0/0 files storedContemporary Accounting Research

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Auction Theory and Applications Accounting and Organizational Management Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we consider the role of production externalities in the task assignment problem. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that complementarities available when agents are assigned to diverse tasks are necessary to overcome distortions in effort allocations caused by an inability to fine‐tune incentives when agents' compensation is based on aggregate imperfect signals. Our analysis formalizes this intuition in a setting that encompasses externalities under both diverse and similar task assignments.

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References

1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design 1993Economics, Organization and Management.1994Managerial Uses of Accounting Information 1996Organizational architecture : a managerial economics approach 2003Complementarity, Task Assignment, and Incentives

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2007Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design

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