Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations: On the Application of the Frame-Selection Model and its Implications

Abstract

The aim of this article is to make a conceptual contribution regarding the occurrence of arguing and bargaining in international negotiations and to loosening the unitary-actor assumption underlying state behavior. To explain the occurrence of arguing and bargaining, Esser (2001, 2004) used the frame-selection model developed for individual actors. Arguing and bargaining are seen as frames–fixed combinations of supreme aims, norms, behavioral routines, and symbols. Once activated, a frame largely determines an actor's behavior. Similar to the mechanism proposed by March and Olsen (1998), actors choose a frame given the symbolic information in the situation, but also given the utility associated with a frame. Formally modeling the choice of arguing and bargaining as frames, Esser (2004) treats states as unitary actors and derives several statements about the occurrence of each mode. The additional contribution of this article is the loosening of this assumption and the derivation of its implications. The frames adopted by states are conceptualized as those frames dominant among the individuals involved in any particular negotiation, be it by being members of delegations or national policy networks. There are fundamental differences between the frame of a person and the frame of a state. Further, each component of a state's frame results from a different aggregation process. Only for some frame components, like interests, an established aggregation process exists. This accounts for the differences in the occurrence and effectiveness of arguing and bargaining at the international level.

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