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A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
8 references·5 citing·47 second hop
A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information (1999)A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism …The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values (1990)The Principal-Agent Relations…Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions (1989)Pre-play communication in two…Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information (1989)Equilibria of the sealed-bid …Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency (1989)Bilateral trade with the seal…Efficient performance in two agent bargaining (1987)Efficient performance in two …Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm (1983)Optimal Selling Strategies: W…Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Mechanism Design by an Inform…Bargaining under Incomplete Information (1983)Bargaining under Incomplete I…Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders (2017)Hidden Reserve Prices with Ri…Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values (2012)Informed-principal problems i…On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (2009)On the informed seller proble…An efficient solution to the informed principal problem (2008)An efficient solution to the …First-mover disadvantage (2005)First-mover disadvantageAuctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions (2003)Chapter 12 Online Auctions (2006)Art Markets without Art, Art without Objects (2021)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)First Mover and Second Mover Advantages (1985)The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)Contextual influences on international subsidiaries' product technology strategy (2004)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Sequential-Equilibrium Investment by Regulated Firms (1992)Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency (2023)Is Pay Transparency Good? (2024)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large (1989)Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation (2000)A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space (2001)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Perfect sequential equilibrium (1986)Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information (1987)A survey of agency models of organizations (1988)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Non-cooperative games (1989)Sheep in Sheep's clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other (1997)Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information (2003)Deliberative voting (2006)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Characterization and computation of nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information (1992)The Bargaining Problem (1950)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining (1993)Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing (2016)Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information (1983)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders (1998)The Limits of Price Discrimination (2015)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts (1995)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1983Bargaining under Incomplete Information620 cited
  • 1983Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal434 cited
  • 1983Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm402 cited
  • 1990The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values400 cited
  • 1989Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency236 cited
  • 1989Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information134 cited
  • 1989Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions125 cited
  • 1987Efficient performance in two agent bargaining76 cited

Cited by

  • 2017Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders47 cited
  • 2005First-mover disadvantage44 cited
  • 2009On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure42 cited
  • 2008An efficient solution to the informed principal problem42 cited
  • 2012Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values40 cited

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