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The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
16 references·3 citing·42 second hop
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects (2002)The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in …The core of an economy with differential information (2005)The core of an economy with d…Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy (2005)Information, efficiency, and …Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core (1999)Incomplete Information, Incen…A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (1999)A characterization of efficie…Economics, Organization and Management. (1993)Economics, Organization and M…Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)Optimal Selling Strategies un…General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information (1984)General Competitive Analysis …Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bila…Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Efficient and Durable Decisio…Incentives in Public Decision-Making. (1980)Incentives in Public Decision…The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information**This work was supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. SOC75-21820 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. (1979)The Property Rights Doctrine …Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Incentives and incomplete inf…Incentives and public inputs (1975)Incentives and public inputsIncentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsOn market games (1969)On market gamesThe Core of an N Person Game (1967)The Core of an N Person GameCOOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS (2013)COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMP…Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information (2007)Virtual utility and the core …Incomplete information, credibility and the core (2005)Incomplete information, credi…The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions (1987)The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect (2000)Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)On balanced sets and cores (1967)The kernel and bargaining set for convex games (1971)Cooperative Fuzzy Games (1981)Liquidity: A New Monetarist Perspective (2017)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (1990)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (1954)The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (1969)A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices (1976)A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries (1989)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness (2005)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Games and Decisions (2015)Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games (1964)Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment (1977)Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)Upper Echelons Theory: An Update (2007)Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)MARKETS AND FREEDOMS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MARKET MECHANISM IN PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS (1993)Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)
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References

  • 1993Economics, Organization and Management.4,644 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
  • 1979Incentives and incomplete information795 cited
  • 1967The Core of an N Person Game695 cited
  • 1983Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information670 cited
  • 1980Incentives in Public Decision-Making.609 cited
  • 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent586 cited
  • 1969On market games387 cited
  • 1975Incentives and public inputs325 cited
  • 1979The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information**This work was supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. SOC75-21820 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University.242 cited
  • 1984General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information220 cited
  • 1999A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms182 cited
  • 2005The core of an economy with differential information161 cited
  • 2005Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy161 cited

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  • 1999Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core116 cited
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    • 2007Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information67 cited
    • 2005Incomplete information, credibility and the core58 cited
    • 2013COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS34 cited