The Marketing Channel as an Equilibrium Set of Contracts

Pinhas Zusman · Michael Etgar

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Abstract

Nash bargaining theory and recent developments in economic contract theory are employed in the analysis of the marketing channels. Individual dyadic contracts involving payment schedules between members of a simple 3 level channel are investigated with particular reference to monitoring problems and intrachannel power relations. The interrelations between individual contracts are examined and the equilibrium set of contracts constituting the channel derived. The performance of the channel in terms of risk sharing, allocative efficiency and the distribution of gains is then evaluated. It is found that the risk aversion of channel members and the cost of monitoring and enforcement affect channel efficiency, and that under certain types of interdependencies and externalities, the nature of the power structure is crucial to channel efficiency.

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References

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