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ABSTRACT Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.
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