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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
4 references·16 citing·33 second hop
Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanis…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mech…An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)An Introduction to the Theory…The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)The Economics of Multidimensi…The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (2010)The Dynamic Pivot MechanismPUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORKIncentives and Political Economy (2001)Incentives and Political Econ…Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation (2000)Mechanism Design with Collusi…Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Computationally feasible VCG …The Market for Evaluations (1999)The Market for EvaluationsAlgorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) (1999)Algorithmic mechanism design …Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem (1992)Contractual Solutions to the …Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions (1991)Experiments with a Decentrali…Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights (1989)Exclusionary manipulation of …Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points (1981)Strategy-Proof Allocation Mec…Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Incentives and incomplete inf…Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)Groves' Scheme on Restricted …Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (1980)Optimal decision-making with minimal waste (2006)Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals (2008)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing (1991)Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature (1999)An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (2013)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Complexity of Mechanism Design (2002)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)Games and Decisions (2015)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (2007)Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)How to run an experimental auction: a review of recent advances (2019)Experimental methods: Eliciting beliefs (2021)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)Open Innovation Engineering—Preliminary Study on New Entrance of Technology to Market (2020)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited

Cited by

  • 1979Incentives and incomplete information795 cited
  • 1999Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)478 cited
  • 2017Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms444 cited
  • 1979Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains413 cited
  • 2015An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design380 cited
  • 1992Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem354 cited
  • 2000Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms325 cited
  • 2000Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation318 cited
  • 1981Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points303 cited
  • 2001Incentives and Political Economy302 cited
  • 2010The Economics of Multidimensional Screening289 cited
  • 1991Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions

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278 cited
  • 1999The Market for Evaluations274 cited
  • 2010The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism271 cited
  • 1989Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights267 cited
  • 2004PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK247 cited