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Package Auctions and Exchanges
16 references·11 citing·29 second hop
Package Auctions and Exchanges (2007)Package Auctions and ExchangesMatching with Contracts (2005)Matching with ContractsPutting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Putting Auction Theory to WorkCombinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003)Combinatorial Auctions: A Sur…Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet (2002)Last-Minute Bidding and the R…Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (2000)Putting Auction Theory to Wor…Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes (1999)Walrasian Equilibrium with Gr…Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? (1990)Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence (1986)Menu Auctions, Resource Alloc…Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bila…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Job Matching, Coalition Forma…Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)Groves' Scheme on Restricted …Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Characterization of Satisfact…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2018)The Attack and Defense of Wea…Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study (2017)Multi‐battle Contests: An Exp…An invitation to market design (2017)An invitation to market designA Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements (2017)A Simple and Approximately Op…Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction (2016)Properties of the Combinatori…Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise? (2015)Is Experimental Economics Liv…An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements (2014)An Efficient and Incentive Co…Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts (2012)Matching in Networks with Bil…Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation (2010)Finding approximate competiti…Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2010)Ascending Prices and Package …Assignment Messages and Exchanges (2009)Assignment Messages and Excha…The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response (2013)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics (1996)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Advanced International Trade : Theory and Evidence Ed. 2 (2004)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness (2005)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) (1999)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Cores of convex games (1971)The assignment game I: The core (1971)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions (2003)Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay' s reputation system (2004)Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from e Bay (2006)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Course in Game Theory (1994)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions (2002)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
  • 2004Putting Auction Theory to Work1,660 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1986Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence1,224 cited
  • 2003Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey986 cited
  • 2002Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet966 cited
  • 1977Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods803 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 2000Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction684 cited
  • 1999Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes624 cited
  • 1979Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains413 cited
  • 1990

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Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?
383 cited

Cited by

  • 2012Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts104 cited
  • 2009Assignment Messages and Exchanges74 cited
  • 2017An invitation to market design70 cited
  • 2010Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation63 cited
  • 2016Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction61 cited
  • 2010Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis60 cited
  • 2014An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements40 cited
  • 2017A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements34 cited
  • 2018The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks30 cited
  • 2017Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study27 cited
  • 2015Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?17 cited