Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics

Josef Hofbauer · Sylvain Sorin · Yannick Viossat

71 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Using an explicit representation in terms of the logit map, we show, in a unilateral framework, that the time average of the replicator dynamics is a perturbed solution of the best-reply dynamics.

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1988Evolution and the Theory of Games 1982Evolution and the Theory of Games 1998Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics 1978Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics 2000A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium 1951An Iterative Method of Solving a Game 2003Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games 1999Adaptive Game Playing Using Multiplicative Weights

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