Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Advertising

Philip C. Jones

7 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Merger and Competition Analysis Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting

Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic model of advertising in a duopoly and studies sales response to steady-state advertising policies. With steady-state advertising policies, sales levels must converge to one of a finite number of equilibria, and the equilibrium set consists of sinks and saddles with one more sink than saddle. When advertising is allowed to vary, the model may admit hysteresis; and we present an example which shows that accounting for word-of-mouth advertising can lead to hysteresis.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 7 citations exist upstream.

References

1957An Operations-Research Study of Sales Response to Advertising 1979Optimizing Advertising Expenditures in a Dynamic Duopoly 1974D. Vandenberg : Being and Education, An Essay in Existential Phenomenology.(Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1971)

Cited by

2024Technical Note—The Generalized Sethi Advertising Model

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.