DOES FACT-FINDING PROMOTE SETTLEMENT? THEORY AND A TEST

David L. Dickinson · Lynn Hunnicutt

15 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

Nonbinding recommendations, such as provided by fact-finders, are shown to significantly increase voluntary settlements in bargaining. Theoretically, it is unclear whether recommendations will increase settlement rates. A recommendation may reduce outcome uncertainty, thereby “chilling” bargaining and increasing dispute rates. On the other hand, a recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which an agreement is made. Which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using theory and data from controlled bargaining experiments. The data show the dominance of a focal point effect for suggestions, highlighting their potential role in improving dispute settlement procedures.(JEL C78, C92, J52)

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2002Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects 1995The Handbook of experimental economics 1995A Theory of Focal Points 2001Mediation 1982A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining 1992Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty 1980An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration 1966Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining?

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