Passive and Active Opportunism in Interorganizational Exchange

Abstract

This article examines how firms in interorganizational relationships respond differently to active and passive opportunism and observes how these opportunism forms erode satisfaction with the performance of these relationships. The multimethod approach of two experiments and one longitudinal field study demonstrate that firms tolerate more passive opportunism than active opportunism (Study 1) and that transaction costs play a mediating role between opportunism form and satisfaction with performance of the relationship (Study 2). Finally, the field study reveals that, over time, passive opportunism has a more corrosive impact on satisfaction with performance than active opportunism (Study 3). Together, the findings underscore the importance of distinguishing passive and active opportunism and the need to develop a better understanding of its management and consequences.

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