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Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
16 references·1 citing·38 second hop
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility (2014)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal…On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation (2013)On the Equivalence of Bayesia…Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships (2012)Relational Contracts and the …Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models (2000)Participation Constraints in …Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities (1999)Multidimensional Mechanism De…Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1997)Solutions manual for Microeco…Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993)Meaning and Credibility in Ch…The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)The Principal-Agent Relations…The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values (1990)The Principal-Agent Relations…Countervailing incentives in agency problems (1989)Countervailing incentives in …Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (1988)Dissolving a Partnership Effi…Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (1987)Dissolving a Partnership Effi…Perfect sequential equilibrium (1986)Perfect sequential equilibriumOptimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm (1983)Optimal Selling Strategies: W…Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Mechanism Design by an Inform…Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bila…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignResource Allocation Under Demand Uncertainty and Private Information (2016)Resource Allocation Under Dem…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information (1987)A survey of agency models of organizations (1988)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Auctions and Bidding (1986)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (1990)Collusion Under Asymmetric Information (1997)Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment (2000)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Collusion and Price Rigidity (2004)Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods (2004)Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information (1983)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders (1998)The Limits of Price Discrimination (2015)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness (2005)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation (2003)Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013)Evolution of the Social Contract (2014)Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts (1995)Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions (2007)Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (2001)A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance (2006)INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE* (2008)
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References

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  • 1997Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green966 cited
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  • 1992The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values485 cited
  • 2000Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models451 cited
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  • 1990The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values400 cited
  • 1986Perfect sequential equilibrium380 cited
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  • 1999Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities297 cited
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  • 2012Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships167 cited
  • 2013On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

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  • 2016Resource Allocation Under Demand Uncertainty and Private Information19 cited