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Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers
5 references·16 citing·36 second hop
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers (2000)Auctions, development, and privatization:…Efficient Auctions (2000)Efficient AuctionsOptimal auction with financially constrained buyers (1996)Optimal auction with financia…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with Budgets (2018)Deep Learning for Revenue-Opt…Auction design without quasilinear preferences (2017)Auction design without quasil…Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach (2014)Optimal Design for Multi-Item…Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Mechanism Design and Approxim…Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets (2014)Efficiency Guarantees in Auct…Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers (2013)Optimal auctions with financi…Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction (2012)Bayesian optimal auctions via…Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers (2011)Cardinal Bayesian allocation …Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents (2011)Bayesian mechanism design for…A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints (2011)A near Pareto optimal auction…Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders (2008)Optimal auctions for asymmetr…Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits (2008)Multi-unit Auctions with Budg…Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints (2007)Simultaneous ascending auctio…Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets (2006)Revenue maximization when bid…On US politics and IMF lending (2005)On US politics and IMF lendingThe Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass (2004)The Unity of Auction Theory: …Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (2015)Redistribution Through Markets (2021)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-cooperative games (1989)The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design (2014)Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion (2016)Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003)An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004)Matching with Contracts (2005)Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness (2010)On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2011)Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets (2011)Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (2001)IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects? (2002)Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly (2009)How U.S. decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957–1982 (2009)Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting (2012)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005)An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities (2006)High Bids and Broke Winners (2001)Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (2012)Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design (2015)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Course in Game Theory (1994)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)Making the Most of Your Samples (2015)Ironing in the Dark (2016)Simple versus Optimal Contracts (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 2000Efficient Auctions288 cited
  • 1996Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers177 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Mechanism Design and Approximation119 cited
  • 2013Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers115 cited
  • 2005On US politics and IMF lending103 cited
  • 2012Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction90 cited
  • 2008Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits85 cited
  • 2006Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets70 cited
  • 2014Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach58 cited
  • 2018Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with Budgets57 cited
  • 2007Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints48 cited
  • 2014Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets47 cited
  • 2011Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents

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47 cited
  • 2017Auction design without quasilinear preferences45 cited
  • 2011Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers40 cited
  • 2008Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders40 cited
  • 2004The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass38 cited
  • 2011A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints37 cited