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Disciplinary measures in response to restatements after Sarbanes–Oxley

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References

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1995Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism

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491 cited

1996CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation483 cited

2008Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings Management403 cited

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2014Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports146 cited
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2017Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance139 cited
2014Of Scapegoats and Signals137 cited
2017Detecting financial restatements using data mining techniques132 cited
2010Are Investors Confused by Restatements after Sarbanes-Oxley?117 cited
2010Increased Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Governance Decisions: Evidence from Chief Financial Officers in the Pre‐ and Post–Sarbanes‐Oxley Periods111 cited
2015Corporate litigation and executive turnover110 cited
2017Clarity Begins at Home: Internal Information Asymmetry and External Communication Quality104 cited
2012Evidence on the Association between Financial Restatements and Auditor Resignations84 cited
2008Restating Under the Radar? Determinants of Restatement Disclosure Choices and the Related Market Reactions83 cited
2015Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct75 cited
2009How costly is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the effects of the Act on corporate profitability68 cited
2018Customer-Base Concentration: Implications for Audit Pricing and Quality63 cited
2016Explaining CEO retention in misreporting firms57 cited
2012Executive Turnover Following Option Backdating Allegations55 cited