Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this article is to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Union (EU) multi‐level system. First, a theoretical framework is set out that attempts to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation – companies, associations and consultants – to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy‐making process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. A number of specific hypotheses about access are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi‐structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.

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