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Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives
16 references·16 citing·32 second hopsampled
Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives (2001)Performance Pay and Top Management Incent…Eclipse of the Public Corporation (1999)Eclipse of the Public Corpora…The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value (1989)The effects of management buy…Stock prices and top management changes (1988)Stock prices and top manageme…Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Outside directors and CEO tur…The choice of organizational form The case of franchising (1987)The choice of organizational …Positive Accounting Theory (1985)Positive Accounting TheoryExecutive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance (1985)Executive compensation, manag…Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme (1983)The Market Mechanism as an In…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsAgency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Problems and the Theor…Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination (1979)Rights and Production Functio…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityAsset returns and inflation (1977)Asset returns and inflationThe Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The Pricing of Options and Co…Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Mergers and the Market for Co…Predatory Value Extraction (2019)Predatory Value ExtractionCommon Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016)Common Ownership, Competition…Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2009)Too Good to be True: Board St…Share Repurchases and Pay‐Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts (2009)Share Repurchases and Pay‐Per…Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories (2009)Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient…What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation? (2008)What’s Wrong with Executive C…Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity (2008)Leveraged Buyouts and Private…Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much? (2006)Why Has CEO Pay Increased so …An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan (2005)An empirical examination of t…Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics (2004)Performance Pay and Teachers'…Balancing private and state ownership in emerging markets' telecommunications infrastructure: country, industry, and firm influences (2004)Balancing private and state o…The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation - a Reply (2002)The Other Side of the Tradeof…Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis (2002)Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A …Earnings Management and Executive Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary? (2002)Earnings Management and Execu…Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing (2001)Market Discipline in the Gove…Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking? (2000)Do Executive Stock Options En…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)The theory and practice of econometrics (1986)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets (1965)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Expected stock returns and volatility (1987)Efficient Capital Markets: II (1991)On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks (1993)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES* (1974)A Closed-Form Solution for Options with Stochastic Volatility with Applications to Bond and Currency Options (1993)Theory of rational option pricing (2005)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature (2001)Performance matched discretionary accrual measures (2005)The economic implications of corporate financial reporting (2005)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)
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References

  • 1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities29,064 cited
  • 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1985Positive Accounting Theory5,837 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1988Outside directors and CEO turnover4,251 cited
  • 1977Asset returns and inflation2,701 cited
  • 1965Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control2,364 cited
  • 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
  • 1999Eclipse of the Public Corporation1,656 cited
  • 1988Stock prices and top management changes1,572 cited
  • 1983The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme1,504 cited
  • 1989The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value1,319 cited
  • 1985Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance1,209 cited
  • 1987The choice of organizational form The case of franchising1,076 cited
  • 1979Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination1,070 cited

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Cited by

  • 2009Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories233 cited
  • 2006Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?203 cited
  • 2008Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity185 cited
  • 2005An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan176 cited
  • 2002Earnings Management and Executive Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary?150 cited
  • 2016Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives150 cited
  • 2002The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation - a Reply140 cited
  • 2009Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance137 cited
  • 2001Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing129 cited
  • 2009Share Repurchases and Pay‐Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts126 cited
  • 2004Balancing private and state ownership in emerging markets' telecommunications infrastructure: country, industry, and firm influences120 cited
  • 2004Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics120 cited
  • 2000Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking?117 cited
  • 2019Predatory Value Extraction115 cited
  • 2002Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis113 cited
  • 2008What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?112 cited