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On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions
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On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions (2015)On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal…The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies (2020)The AI Economist: Improving E…Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity (2019)Selling multiple correlated g…Optimal auctions through deep learning (2019)Optimal auctions through deep…The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization (2018)The Sample Complexity of Up-t…Dispersion for Data-Driven Algorithm Design, Online Learning, and Private Optimization (2018)Dispersion for Data-Driven Al…The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation (2017)The menu-size complexity of r…Revenue Optimization with Approximate Bid Predictions (2017)Revenue Optimization with App…Oracle-Efficient Online Learning and Auction Design (2017)Oracle-Efficient Online Learn…The sample complexity of auctions with side information (2016)The sample complexity of auct…Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves (2016)Minimizing Regret with Multip…Learning Simple Auctions (2016)Learning Simple AuctionsA Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices (2016)A Field Guide to Personalized…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Games and economic behavior (1989)Simple versus optimal mechanisms (2009)Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples (2017)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2020)Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes (1987)Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions (2021)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design (2018)Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design (1988)Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist (2005)Prediction, Learning, and Games (2006)On the Complexity of Best Arm Identification in Multi-Armed Bandit Models (2014)Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy (2016)The value of knowing a demand curve: bounds on regret for online posted-price auctions (2004)Regulatory Instruments for Fair Personalized Pricing (2022)The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem (2002)A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context (1987)Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm (1983)A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation (1927)Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for simulating human systems (2002)The economy needs agent-based modelling (2009)Comparing minds and machines: implications for financial stability (2021)Computational Experiments for Complex Social Systems—Part I: The Customization of Computational Model (2021)Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks (2021)
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Cited by

  • 2020The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies83 cited
  • 2016The sample complexity of auctions with side information72 cited
  • 2016Learning Simple Auctions70 cited
  • 2017Revenue Optimization with Approximate Bid Predictions51 cited
  • 2019Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity49 cited
  • 2018Dispersion for Data-Driven Algorithm Design, Online Learning, and Private Optimization48 cited
  • 2017The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation44 cited
  • 2016A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices39 cited
  • 2016Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves34 cited
  • 2019Optimal auctions through deep learning33 cited
  • 2018The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization31 cited
  • 2017Oracle-Efficient Online Learning and Auction Design30 cited

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