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Contrats d'assurance multipériodiques et déformation des croyances
11 references·0 citing·44 second hopsampled
Contrats d'assurance multipériodiques et déformation des croyances (2006)Contrats d'assurance multipériodiques et …Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2000)Adverse Selection in Insuranc…Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets (1994)Adverse Selection, Commitment…Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets (1990)Adverse Selection, Private In…Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Prospect theory: An analysis …Multi-period insurance contracts (1987)Multi-period insurance contra…Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection (1985)Multi-period contracts betwee…Market equilibrium with private knowledge (1985)Market equilibrium with priva…Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information (1982)Optimal Multiperiod Contracts…A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)A model of insurance markets …Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)Risk Classification and Social Welfare (2006)Participation in Micro Life Insurance and the Use of Other Financial Services in Ghana (2011)Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans (2014)Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover (1979)Cream skimming, asymmetric information, and a competitive insurance market (1984)The Microeconomics of Insurance (2008)Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information‐Insensitive Triggers (2009)Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing (1976)Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition (1990)The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence (2000)Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (2006)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting (1985)Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations (1986)Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack (1988)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Status quo bias in decision making (1988)Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs (1992)Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Marketing System (1996)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Stability in Competition (1990)Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an Economy with Multi-Period Financial Relationships (1992)Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (2005)Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions (2007)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales (1976)Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. (1987)Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? (2000)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms (1961)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning (1991)Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance (2007)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market (1977)Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work (2010)SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE (2013)Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data (1999)The Theory of Risk Classification (2013)
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References

  • 1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk32,475 cited
  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information4,984 cited
  • 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1,036 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1982Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information270 cited
  • 1990Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets151 cited
  • 1994Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets142 cited
  • 2000Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets127 cited
  • 1987Multi-period insurance contracts119 cited
  • 1985Market equilibrium with private knowledge88 cited
  • 1985Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection82 cited

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