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The sample complexity of auctions with side information

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References

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2014The sample complexity of revenue maximization198 cited
2011Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions164 cited
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2007Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning90 cited
2015On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions82 cited

Cited by

2018Dispersion for Data-Driven Algorithm Design, Online Learning, and Private Optimization48 cited
2017Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples45 cited
2020A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer45 cited
2018Selling to a No-Regret Buyer41 cited

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