Corporate Resources and Regulatory Pressures: Toward Explaining a Discrepancy

Abstract

The suggestions of Stephen Wasby, David Andersen, Richard Hall, Gwen Moore, Robert Quinn, John Rohrbaugh, andASQ reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. This paper presents a preliminary framework for understanding why politically and legally strong corporations face significant regulatory pressures. Three general factors are addressed. First, divisions within and between industries bring about unlikely proregulation coalitions. Second, the responses of agencies to pressures do not reflect the balance of resources among interested organizations because (1) the marginal values of technical lobbying decline significantly after a point because of agency standardization of responses, and (2) regulatory organizations do not react in neutral ways to competing claims because of their cultures and stability. Third, proregulation litigation, the diverse dispositions of federal courts, and rules of judicial review interact to considerably offset better endowed corporate litigation. Studies are suggested on the variance of units within sectors and on the development of dialectical and decision-making perspectives on regulation.*

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