Virtue in the Cave

Abstract

Abstract Offers an interpretation of Plato's Meno that seeks to illuminate the particularly “therapeutic” philosophy that Socrates practices. It argues that the Meno, rather than constituting a bridge between “Socratic” and “Platonic” dialogues by way of the introduction of distinctively “Platonic” doctrines such as metempsychosis and learning as recollection, the dialogue employs these ideas to urge Meno to take up the life of moral inquiry. Confronting a young man eager for virtue (success), Socrates attempts to focus Meno's attention on the importance of inquiring into the nature of virtue, the nature of the truly excellent human life. Struggling against both Meno's youthful impatience and his overarching desire for power and wealth, Socrates argues for a life in which the virtues – justice, temperance, and piety, in particular – constitute the core of genuine success. To counter Meno's resistance to elenctic investigation, to disarm Meno's challenge to an inquiry conducted by someone who himself lacks knowledge, Socrates fashions the myth of recollection, followed by the demonstration with the slave boy, in order to convince Meno that even such inquiry is of value. Socrates is no believer in the idea that all knowledge is recollected: most knowledge, he thinks, is learned from those who know and from those who can prove that they know. And the demonstration with the slave boy is no demonstration of recollection: what it is is a lesson in geometry, but one artfully disguised as an elenchus through which the slave‐boy presumably “recollects” the solution. When Meno, despite Socrates’ valiant efforts to coax him back to the inquiry into the all‐important question of what virtue is, wishes still to consider only how one gets virtue, Socrates tries his best to benefit Meno by protecting him from harmful beliefs and influences, arguing that virtue comes neither by nature (so Meno may not arrogantly assume he already has it), nor by teaching (so Meno need not seek out further sophistic training), nor spontaneously (so Meno has no reason to associate with such men as Anytus). If virtue comes at all, Socrates contends, it comes by divine dispensation – or at least that is how political success is acquired: whether or not one makes a name for oneself is ultimately a matter of luck. How is real virtue, as opposed to political success, attained? By the hard work of moral inquiry, by examination, and investigation that leads to true and right opinions.

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