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Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams
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Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams (2017)Shareholders and managers as principal-ag…Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)Founding‐Family Ownership and…Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)Agency costs of free cash flo…Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flo…Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have (1984)Corporate Financing and Inves…Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Corporate financing and inves…Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Problems and the Theor…Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)Transaction-Cost Economics: T…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Market for "Lemons": Qual…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Nature of the Firm (1937)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The theory of economic growth (1955)"The Economic Value of Education." (1964)Risk and insurance (1973)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy Formulation (1991)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)GROWTH, BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS (1982)Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends (1984)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK* (1970)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)The Capital Structure Puzzle (1984)Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature (2001)Toward a knowledge‐based theory of the firm (1996)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance (2007)Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage (1989)The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource‐based view (1993)The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (2004)Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? (1997)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism24,221 cited
  • 1984Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have18,936 cited
  • 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
  • 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
  • 1979Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations10,390 cited
  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1996Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers9,308 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1984Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have6,535 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 2003Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

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5,127 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
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