Top Management Team Pay Structure and Corporate Social Performance

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of top management team (TMT) pay structure characteristics (such as pay dispersion, long-term variable pay, and short-term variable pay) on corporate social performance (CSP) based on upper echelon theory and agency theory. The analysis using a large panel sample of US public firms reveals that long-term oriented and egalitarian TMT pay structure has a positive influence on CSP. In addition, the negative influence of short-term variable pay on CSP becomes stronger as the pay difference among TMT members becomes greater. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings will be discussed.

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