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ABSTRACT Generalist CEOs receive higher pay than specialist CEOs. We examine the implications of CEO expertise for the structure of executive compensation. We follow contract theory and predict that information asymmetry induces generalist CEOs to overstate their ability to a larger extent when contracting with shareholders. Boards of directors take this into account by designing compensation contracts that link their pay more closely to firm performance. Our empirical results support this prediction, and the link is more pronounced when generalist CEOs are less known in the executive labor market or are hired externally. The results hold after we control for a battery of factors that potentially affect incentive pay, including firm characteristics and CEO ability. Overall, our results support the optimal contracting perspective of executive compensation and highlight the importance of CEO expertise generality in resolving adverse selection during the contracting process. JEL Classifications: G34; J24; J33.
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